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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Reed Taylor ("Taylor") brought suit against Richard A. Riley ("Riley") for, inter alia, 
professional negligence based on a 1995 Opinion Letter addressed to Taylor regarding a Stock 
Redemption Agreement with Riley's client AlA Services Corporation ("AlA"). This is a 
permissive appeal from the district court's October 24,2012 Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration ("Opinion and Order") in which the court ruled that: (1) res judicata did not bar 
Taylor's professional negligence claim against Riley; (2) Taylor did not waive his claims against 
AlA's agents (including Riley) when the original transaction for which the Opinion Letter was 
given was restructured; (3) Taylor's subsequent agreement with his ex-wife, whereby she agreed 
to subordinate to Taylor her otherwise first priority right to payment by AlA for her preferred stock 
("2006 Subordination Agreement") was not the proximate cause of Taylor's alleged damages; and 
(4) Riley owed a duty to Taylor despite the lack of an attorney/client relationship. 
As an initial matter, Riley requests this Court determine the effect on Taylor's claim against 
Riley of its previous determination that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and 
unenforceable. Riley acknowledges that this was not an issue addressed in the Opinion and Order 
and is an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Idaho case law provides, however, that illegality 
is to be raised sua sponte and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Riley requests the Court 
accept for review the issue of whether the illegality doctrine prevents Taylor from recovering 
against AlA's agent (Riley) based on the illegal agreement between Taylor and Riley's principal 
(AlA). 
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Riley further seeks reversal of the res judicata ruling on the grounds that Taylor previously 
sued him for professional negligence and therefore did, could have or should have brought the 
current claim for professional negligence in that prior action, thereby barring this cause of action. 
Alternatively, the waiver and changed circumstances/proximate cause holdings should be 
reversed because of express waiver and release provisions in the 1996 agreements that restructured 
the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and a subsequent change in circumstances (the 2006 
Subordination Agreement) which became the actual, proximate cause of Taylor's alleged damages. 
The final issue is whether an attorney owes a duty to a non-client. The district court held 
that Taylor's status as an opinion recipient created a new exception to the general rule that an 
attorney owes his loyalty only to his client. This Court has refused to extend a duty to a non-client 
except for one narrow exception, inapplicable here. Riley seeks a reversal of the district court's 
ruling that a third-party non-client is owed a duty by someone else's attorney. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Taylor filed his Complaint against Riley on October 1,2009. (R., pp. 25-50.) He alleged 
five causes of action: (1) Negligent Misrepresentation; (2) Negligence/Malpractice; (3) Consumer 
Protection Act Violations; (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duties; and (5) Fraud. Id He also sued Hawley 
Troxell, Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. Id Riley and the other Defendants filed Answers. 
(R., pp. at 51-89.) Among other affirmative defenses, Riley pled waiver and res judicata. (R., p. 
64; 65.) 
On April 21 ,2010, Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in favor of all Defendants 
on the Negligent Misrepresentation and Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims. Both claims were 
dismissed with prejudice. (R., p. 1674.) On May 10,2010, Taylor's remaining causes of action 
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against Hawley Troxell were dismissed. (R., p. 1677.) Taylor's derivative claims, as well as 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties claim, were dismissed against all defendants. ld. On April 5, 2012, 
the Fraud claim against Riley was dismissed on summary judgment. (R., p. 1766.) 
On October 24, 2012, the district court issued the Opinion and Order on appeal denying 
Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal ofthe single remaining cause of action 
-Professional Negligence. (R., p. 2556.) 
This Court granted Riley's Motion for Permission to Appeal on January 17,2013. The 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed on February 6, 2013. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
This Court is likely familiar with the background and relevant facts of this most current 
appeal from its review of two prior appeals taken from three prior lawsuits, all arising out of the 
Stock Redemption Agreement. See Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010)1 
and Taylorv. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). The following are pertinent 
excerpts from this Court's prior recitation of facts from the decisions in the two prior appeals 
(enclosed by quotation marks), plus additional facts pertinent to this fourth lawsuit and third 
appeal, all arising out of the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
1. Facts Relevant to the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
"Reed Taylor is the founder of AlA Insurance, an insurance agency based in Lewiston, 
Idaho, which sells insurance products to farmers and members of various agricultural growers 
associations. Reed Taylor was the majority shareholder of AlA Services, a holding company 
I Taylor sued McNichols and his law firm and separately sued Riley and Hawley Troxell, et al. 
These two lawsuits were consolidated on appeal and will be referred to collectively as "Riley 
Lawsuit #1". 
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which has wholly-owned AlA Insurance at all times relevant to this lawsuit. In 1995, he held 63 
percent of approximately 973,000 outstanding shares of AlA Services common stock and served 
as the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer of AlA Services." 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 556, 261 P.3d at 833. 
"On July 12, 1995, AlA Services Corporation (AlA Services) entered into a Stock 
Redemption Agreement with Appellant Reed Taylor to purchase all of his shares (613,494 shares) 
in AlA Services for a $1.5 million down payment promissory note, a $6 million promissory note 
and other consideration. . .. AlA Services failed to pay a $1.5 million note issued to Reed Taylor 
under the Stock Redemption Agreement when it became due on October 20, 1995. Reed Taylor 
and AlA Services agreed to modifY the Stock Redemption Agreement and entered into the Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement, but thereafter, AlA Services failed to make certain payments 
that had become due under the new terms." ld. 
2. Facts Relevant to the Opinion Letter. 
On August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin drafted an Opinion Letter at the request of its corporate 
client, AlA. (R., p. 563.) Riley participated in the preparation of the Opinion Letter. ld. Taylor 
was the recipient of the Opinion Letter. ld. Neither Eberle Berlin nor Riley represented Taylor in 
the Stock Redemption Agreement or for purposes of the Opinion Letter. Taylor was represented 
by separate counsel. 2 
2 Taylor's attorney at the time was Scott Bell, an attorney with a Seattle, Washington firm. (R., 
pp. 563-564; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 70, 11. 14-17.) Taylor filed yet another lawsuit, this time against his 
own attorney, Mr. Bell, for alleged malpractice in representing Taylor in the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement and, inter alia, for not obtaining an opinion letter for that 
transaction. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 56, 11. 3-7; R. at 1832.) 
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3. Facts Relevant to the 2007 AlA Lawsuit. 
"On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AlA Services, AlA Insurance and 
John Taylor, seeking to recover the amounts owed on the two promissory notes." Taylor, 151 
Idaho at 556, 261 P.3d at 833. ("AlA Lawsuit") (R., pp. 2388-2433.) 
"In April, 2008, Respondents [AlA] filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
concerning the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement, arguing that when the agreement was 
entered into, it violated the then-existing I.C. § 30-1-6, which authorizes corporations to redeem 
their shares but places restrictions on the source offunds used to redeem shares. The district court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents in its Opinion and Order dated June 
17, 2009. '" The district court then declared the Stock Redemption Agreement illegal and 
unenforceable and concluded that it must leave the parties where it finds them." Id., 151 Idaho at 
558,261 P.3d at 835. This Court affirmed the district court's finding that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal and unenforceable. Id., 151 Idaho at 574-575, 261 P.3d at 851-852. 
4. Facts Relevant to Riley Lawsuit #1. 
"On August 18, 2008, after the Underlying Case [AlA Lawsuit] had been through 21 
months of motions and hearings ... Reed filed the present actions against McNichols and CBM, 
who were continuing to serve as counsel for John Taylor ... , and against Babbitt, Ashby, Patrick 
Collins, Richard Riley, HTEH, and other unspecified attorneys who worked for HTEH based on 
its representation of the AlA Entities. . .. Reed asserted claims against Respondents [Riley, et 
al.] for: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the commission of tortious acts in the 
Underlying Case [AlA Lawsuit]; (2) conversion and misappropriation of the AlA Entities' 
corporate assets; (3) violations ofIdaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601 et seq; and (4) 
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professional negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duties." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 
831,243 P.3d 642,647 (2010). (Underlining and bracketed words added.) (R., pp. 620-645.) 
On October 15, 2008, Taylor moved to amend his complaint in response to a motion to 
dismiss his original complaint for failure to state a claim. (R., p. 669.) In support of his 
professional negligence claim he added numerous allegations relating to the Opinion Letter, 
including that Riley breached duties owed to Taylor by and through the Opinion Letter which 
invoked Riley's personal liability. (R., pp. 676-77; 697; 704-10; 713.) 
5. Facts Relevant to Riley Lawsuit #2. 
On October 1,2009, Taylor filed the present action, suing Riley and Hawley Troxell for a 
second time. (R., p. 25.) ("Riley Lawsuit #2") Taylor asserted five causes of action, including 
Professional Negligence based on duties allegedly owed to Taylor by and through the Opinion 
Letter. (R., p. 41.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Does the illegality doctrine preclude Taylor from recovering damages against Riley 
based on the illegal and unenforceable Stock Redemption Agreement? 
B. Did the district court err in finding that Taylor's professional negligence claim 
against Riley is not barred by res judicata? 
C. Did the district court err in finding that Taylor did not waive his professional 
negligence claim against Riley when the Stock Redemption Agreement was restructured? 
D. Did the district court err in finding that changed circumstances were not the 
proximate cause of Taylor's alleged professional negligence damages? 
E. Did the district court err in finding that Riley owed a duty to Taylor, a non-client? 
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F. Is Riley entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) upon the conclusion of this lawsuit, ifhe is the prevailing party? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
As long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may 
be entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for claims that are fundamentally related 
to the commercial transaction yet sound in tort. Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Furhman, P.A., 
154 Idaho 21, 293 P.3d 645, 651 (2013). This rule applies to an action for legal malpractice. Id. 
Here, the alleged legal malpractice claim is fundamentally related to the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, a commercial transaction. Although no party to an illegal commercial transaction is 
entitled to fees, Riley was not a party to the Stock Redemption Agreement. Riley acknowledges 
that this is a permissive appeal and there has not yet been a determination in the district court 
regarding who is a prevailing party, but Riley seeks a ruling by this Court that ifhe is the prevailing 
party, attorney fees incurred on appeal can be awarded by the district court. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review. 
1. Illegality of Contract. Illegality of contracts is a question oflaw to be raised sua 
sponte and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 
768 (2002). 
2. Summary Judgment. This Court applies the standards applicable to summary 
judgment which require this Court, upon review, to liberally construe facts in the existing record 
in favor of the non-moving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor 
of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Glenn, 139 Idaho 799, 801, 87 P.3d 286, 288 (2003). 
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3. Res Judicata. This Court exercises free review over the question of whether an 
action is barred by res judicata. Kootenai Electric Co-Op, Inc. v. LaMar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 
119,219 P.3d 440, 443 (2009). 
4. Waiver. The theory of waiver presents mixed questions oflaw and fact which this 
Court reviews de novo. The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 70, 936 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(1997). 
5. Proximate Cause. When a district court decides on summary judgment whether 
certain conduct was a proximate cause, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard 
used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Athay v. Stacey, 142 
Idaho 360, 367, 128 P.3d 897, 904 (2005). 
6. Duty. The existence of a duty is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises 
free review. Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 675,273 P.3d 1266, 1268 (2012). 
B. Taylor is Precluded by the Illegality Doctrine From Recovering Any Damages Based 
on the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in the litigation, including for the first 
time on appeal. Trees, 138 Idaho at 6, 56 P.3d at 768. In Trees, the parties did not argue the 
illegality of the agreement until the appeal. Id. Nevertheless, this Court accepted review of the 
issue, finding that the illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in the litigation and the 
Court itself has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte. Id. The effect of the illegality 
of the Stock Redemption Agreement on Taylor's professional negligence claim against Riley 
should be considered on appeal even if for the first time. 
As a general rule, an illegal contract is unenforceable; therefore no action or recovery can 
be based on an illegal agreement, either at law or in equity. 17 A Am.Jur. 2d Contracts § 299. A 
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party to an illegal contract cannot ask the Court to have his illegal objects carried out, as the law 
will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 400, 49 P.3d 
402, 405 (2002). Instead, the court will leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them. 
Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2009). 
A cause of action cannot be pursued if it arises out of the performance of an illegal contract. 
17 A Am.Jur. 2d Contracts § 299. Only "when a plaintiff can maintain his cause of action without 
the aid of an illegal act or an illegal agreement, ... will [he] be entitled to recover." Trees, 138 
Idaho at 9,56 P.3d at 771 (quoting McConnon v. Holden, 35 Idaho 75,82,204 P. 656,663 (1922)). 
When the claims and damages are so intertwined with and intrinsically founded upon the 
underlying contract, there can be no recovery of damages. White v. Miller, 718 So.2d 88, 90 
(Ala.Civ.App. 1998) (Stated differently, the contractor cannot circumvent the licensing statute by 
asserting claims for fraud and deceit when the facts surrounding his claims are grounded in the 
illegal contract.). 
Idaho extends the general to rule to attempts to enforce the illegal contract against a third 
party. In Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 436 P.2d 248 (1968), this Court denied recovery ofa 
real estate commission to a party to an illegal real estate agreement. This Court also held the third-
party issuer of the surety bond was not required to pay under the surety bond because the 
underlying agreement was illegal. ld, 92 Idaho at 36,436 P.2d at 25l. 
This Court has previously ruled that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and 
could not be enforced against AlA. Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 574-75, 261 
P.3d 829, 851-52 (2011). Having been barred from recovering damages from the principal to the 
illegal Stock Redemption Agreement (AlA), Taylor should not be allowed to circumvent the 
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illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement by seeking damages from AlA's agent (Riley). By 
virtue of this Court's holding, the parties were to be left where the district court found them, 
without a right to recover damages based on that illegal agreement, even as against someone not a 
party to the agreement. 
Only when a party qualifies for an exception to the general rule of un enforceability can the 
party recover under an illegal contract. Farrell, 146 Idaho at 611, 200 P.3d at 1160. Idaho 
recognizes some exceptions to the unenforceability of an illegal contract: 
This Court has recognized a certain limited exception to the 
illegality doctrine when public policy requires that some relief be 
granted. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P .3d 1153 (2009). 
Additionally, when parties are not "in pari delicto" or when fraud, 
undue influence, or duress are present relief may be granted to the 
innocent party. Barry v. Pac. W Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 833, 
103 P.3d 440, 446 (2004). Finally, this Court has allowed some 
relief to insureds who signed void insurance contracts, in cases 
where unenforceability would "defeat the purpose for which a 
statute has been entered." ld. 
Taylor v. AlA, 151 Idaho at 565, 261 P.3d at 842. Taylor previously sought to enforce the illegal 
Stock Redemption Agreement under these exceptions based on the following: 
... (1) the shareholders acquiesced to the redemption for over twelve 
years; (2) he was justifiably ignorant and an innocent party and/or 
not in pari delicto; (3) the fraud exception to illegality applies; (4) 
the violation was merely technical; and (5) public policy grounds 
support enforcing the redemption agreement. .. , 
ld. This Court rejected Taylor's attempts to enforce the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement, 
ruling: 
(1) it could not be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel; 
(2) Taylor was not justifiably ignorant; 
(3) Taylor was not an innocent ("This is not a case where the parties to the 
agreement were not in pari delicto . .. "); 
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(4) Taylor was not fraudulently induced to enter into the Stock Redemption 
Agreement by the Opinion Letter; 
(5) the basis for illegality was not merely a technical violation ofIdaho Code § 
30-1-6; and 
(6) the Stock Redemption Agreement was precisely the type of agreement the 
statute prohibits - an agreement that could drain AlA for the benefit of 
Taylor at the expense of other shareholders or creditors. 
Id. at 567,261 P.3d at 844. 
This Court defined the parameters of the public policy exception to the unenforceability of 
an illegal contact as follows: 
This Court has recognized situations in which relief to a party to an 
illegal contract is warranted to avoid unduly harsh results. In such 
instances, the Court has awarded damages based on the rationale 
that, although illegal contracts are unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy, circumstances arise where denying a party relief 
would frustrate the public interest more than "leaving the parties 
where they lie." This Court has stated that, "[b Jarring the strict 
application of the illegality doctrine, the central focus must be 
whether the ends of the law will be furthered or defeated by granting 
the relief requested." Trees, 138 Idaho at 9,56 P.3d at 771. 
Id. Taylor sought application of the public policy exception based on "the malfeasance of other 
parties and their attorneys in engineering the illegal agreement and unlawfully transferring millions 
of dollars from AlA Services to another entity, CropUSA." Id. (Emphasis added.) This Court 
refused to enforce the illegal Stock Redemption Agreement on public policy grounds because: (1) 
the agreement favored Taylor at the expense of minority shareholders and creditors; (2) no party 
recognized the potential violation ofIdaho Code §30-1-6; and (3) not enforcing the agreement was 
not harsh because Taylor had already received substantial sums of money (noted to be over $9 
million) from AlA pursuant to the illegal agreement. Id., and n. 3. 
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Here, Taylor is attempting to recover damages based on and arising out of the illegal Stock 
Redemption Agreement through the guise of a malpractice action against the attorney for the other 
party to the illegal contract. This he cannot do. As a party to that illegal contract, Taylor is 
precluded from any such recovery from the principal and the same should apply to Riley either as 
AlA's agent or as a non-party to the agreement because any such recovery relies on the illegal 
contract. This Court has already ruled that no exceptions to the illegality doctrine apply to Taylor, 
that public policy considerations do not prevail and Taylor must be left as he was found (i.e., 
without recourse). This Court should not now aid a party to the illegal contract by moving him 
from where he was left and allow him to recover based on that illegal agreement. 
This Court should consider illegality sua sponte. Illegality precludes Taylor from 
recovering damages against Riley and this action should be remanded to the district court with 
instructions to dismiss the remaining claim against Riley. 
C. The District Court Erred in Finding Taylor's Claim of MalpracticelNegligence 
Against Riley was Not Barred by Res Judicata. 
The district court held Taylor's claim for professional negligence against Riley in the 
present action (Riley Lawsuit #2) was not barred by res judicata because it did not arise out of the 
same transaction as the previous professional negligence claim asserted in Riley Lawsuit #1. (R., 
pp.2562-2563.) The district court erred for the following reasons: (1) it failed to recognize that 
Taylor actually brought a professional negligence claim in the prior litigation; (2) it disregarded 
Taylor's opportunity to litigate his present professional negligence claim in Riley Lawsuit #1; (3) 
it misapplied the broad "same transaction" test; (4) it disregarded the broader "series of 
transactions" test; and (5) it disregarded its own prior rulings that res judicata barred causes of 
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action against other parties based on the similarities between Riley Lawsuit # 1 and Riley Lawsuit 
#2. The district court can be reversed for anyone or all of these errors. 
1. Res Judicata Applies to Bar Taylor's Professional Negligence Claim. 
"Res judicata prevents the same plaintiff from bringing multiple lawsuits against the same 
defendant for actions arising from the same event." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 
P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the 
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the 
same parties upon the same claim. Id The three fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: 
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution 
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter 
were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it serves the 
public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of 
repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private interest in 
repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). 
If ever there was an object lesson for application of the purposes and principles of res 
judicata, this is it. This is the fourth lawsuit initiated by Taylor and third appeal arising out of the 
Stock Redemption Agreement. By bringing another lawsuit (Riley Lawsuit #2) against the same 
parties upon the same claim alleged in Riley Lawsuit #1, Taylor has refused to accept the adverse 
resolution of the prior judicial disputes, has advocated for the corrosive disrespect of these prior 
resolutions by seeking inconsistent results, has burdened the courts with repetitious litigation and 
rides roughshod over Riley's private interest in repose by harassing him with repetitive claims. 
Taylor has already had his opportunity, and in fact took the opportunity, to sue Riley for 
professional negligence in Riley Lawsuit #1. He should not be allowed to do it again. The 
fundamental purposes served by res judicata are undermined by Riley Lawsuit #2. The endless 
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litigation and multiplicity of needless lawsuits arising out of the Stock Redemption Agreement 
have clogged our court system for long enough. The interest of proper administration of justice is 
best served by barring this and any further litigation relating to the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
This Court has identified the three elements required for application of the doctrine of res 
judicata: (1) identity of parties, (2) identity of subject matter, and (3) finality of judgment. Farmers 
Nat. Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 67, 878 P.2d 762, 766 (1994). 
a. Identity of Parties. 
Identity of parties refers to the rule that the same party or those in privity with such party 
may not relitigate claims already litigated. Shirey, 126 Idaho at 68-9, 878 P.2d at 767-8. Both 
Taylor and Riley are parties in Riley Lawsuit #2 and were parties in Riley Lawsuit #1. There is 
an exact identity of parties. 
b. Identity of Subject Matter. 
Identity of subject matter exists if the claims in both actions arise out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149,804 
P.2d 319, 322 (1990). Riley Lawsuit #1 and #2 arise out of the Stock Redemption Agreement. As 
discussed in more detail below, there is an identity of subject matter. 
(1) The Claim for Professional Negligence in Riley Lawsuit #2 was 
Previously Asserted in Riley Lawsuit #1. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars relitigation of a claim previously asserted. 
Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94,57 P.3d at 805. The Fourth Cause of Action in Riley Lawsuit #1 is 
not titled, but in it Taylor alleges Riley, as one of the Defendants, owed Taylor "a duty of care to 
provide ... professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with the standard of care 
in the legal profession;" that Riley breached the standard of care in the legal profession which 
14 
caused damage to Taylor; and that Riley's acts "constitute professional negligence." CR., p. 644, 
,,62,64.) This professional negligence claim was based, in part, on factual allegations that Riley 
issued an Opinion Letter relating to the Stock Redemption Agreement and that Riley's assertion 
that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal violated his duties to Taylor and were counter 
to the opinions in the Opinion Letter. CR., p. 641, , 53.) 
The Second Cause of Action in Riley Lawsuit #2 is specifically entitled 
"Negligence/Malpractice." CR., p. 41.) This claim is based on nearly identical allegations as made 
in Riley Lawsuit #1: that Riley owed Taylor "a duty of care to provide ... professional legal 
advice in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession," CR., p. 42, ~ 42); that Riley 
breached the duty of care owed to Taylor CR., pp. 42-43, ,43); and that Taylor was damaged 
thereby CR., p. 43, '44). Taylor again labels Riley's acts as "professional negligence." CR., p. 43, 
~ 45.) This claim is also supported by the same factual allegations that Riley, through Hawley 
Troxell, asserted the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement in violation of his duties to 
Taylor and counter to the conclusions oflaw expressed in the Opinion Letter. CR., pp. 34, 35, 41, 
,,23,24, 39.) 
Taylor's present claim for professional negligence is a claim previously asserted in Riley 
Lawsuit # 1. There is an exact identity of subject matter. The district court's res judicata inquiry 
should have ended there. Res judicata should have barred Taylor from bringing the same 
professional negligence claim asserted in the prior lawsuit. The district court erred in failing to 
dismiss this cause of action. 
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(2) The Claim for Professional Negligence in Riley Lawsuit #2 
Could Have Been Brought in Riley Lawsuit #1. 
"The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent reIitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of 
action which were actually made or which might have been made." Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 
57 P.3d at 805 (emphasis added). "It is 'well established' in Idaho law that 'in an action between 
the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and 
privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Shirey, 126 Idaho at 70, 878 
P.2d at 769. 
If the present claim for professional negligence was not actually brought in Riley Lawsuit 
#1, it could have been and any claims relating to that claim should have been brought in that prior 
lawsuit. Taylor's failure to do so should have barred this second professional negligence claim. 
The facts upon which Taylor bases his Complaint in Riley Lawsuit #2 were all known to 
Taylor when he filed his Complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1 on August 18, 2008. All parties were 
aware that Taylor claimed AlA had breached the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. (R., 
p. 2409.) On April 16, 2008, prior to Taylor filing the Complaint in Riley Lawsuit #1, the 
defendants in the AlA Lawsuit had raised the defense that the Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement was unenforceable because it constituted an illegal contract. (R., pp. 1950-1960.) 
Indeed, Hawley Troxell's raising of this defense while Riley was an attorney there was the reason 
Taylor named Riley in Riley Lawsuit #1. (R., p. 641, ~ 53.) 
Because of this illegality defense and well before Riley Lawsuit #1 was filed, Taylor 
threatened litigation against Riley and Hawley Troxell, as AlA's attorneys, based on the very same 
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actions as he now alleges as the bases for Riley Lawsuit #2. For example, on July 21,2008 (nearly 
one month before filing Riley Lawsuit # 1), Taylor's attorney addressed a letter to the AlA Board 
of Directors demanding that the corporation sue Riley, Hawley Troxell and others for, among other 
things: 
Representing AlA Services and/or AlA insurance in making 
inappropriate arguments (including alleged illegality of the debt to 
Reed) knowing that such arguments were counter to AlA Services' 
obligations to Reed and Donna and knowing that Richard Riley was 
a witness who provided a legal opinion counter to such arguments; 
(R., pp. 379-382.) On August 5, 2008 (nearly two weeks before filing Riley Lawsuit #1), Taylor's 
attorney emailed attorney Babbitt of Hawley Troxell with additional threats to sue Riley and 
Hawley Troxell based upon, among other things, the Opinion Letter. 
Explain to Mr. [Merlyn] Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion 
letter to Reed and you are now tying [sic) to disingenuously argue 
the $8.5 million is not owed to him .... Explain to Mr. Clark that 
even if the illegality argument had merit, Donna Taylor and Reed 
Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such 
an instance regardless of the circumstances. 
(R., p. 377 (Underlining and parenthetical in original).) 
Taylor knew that AlA was challenging the enforceability and legality of the Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement, notwithstanding the Opinion Letter, before Riley Lawsuit # 1 
was filed. Taylor claimed that Riley's conduct in relation to the Opinion Letter was 
"inappropriate", counter to Riley's obligations to him and threatened to sue him because of Riley's 
involvement with the Opinion Letter; all before Riley Lawsuit #1 was filed. Taylor could have 
brought (assuming he did not) his professional negligence claims against Riley in Riley Lawsuit 
#l. Because he could have brought these claims in the prior lawsuit, he was required to do so, 
including any and all related claims. His failure to do so precludes the relitigation of professional 
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negligence in this lawsuit. The district court erred when it failed to dismiss this cause of action on 
the grounds of res judicata. 
(3) The Present Professional Negligence Claim Arises Out of the 
Same Transaction or Series of Transactions as the Previous 
Professional Negligence Claim. 
Idaho has adopted the broad "transactional approach" to res judicata. us. Bank Nat'!. 
Ass'n. v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000). "[A] valid and final judgment 
rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150, 804 P.2d at 323. 
See also Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912 915-16, 684 P.2d 314, 317-18 (Ct.App. 1984) ("[T]he rule 
against splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit 
are different from those demanded in another.") Courts are not limited to examining whether the 
subsequent case is based upon the same cause of action or legal theory as the prior litigation. 
Rather, "[w]hen a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim 
. . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant 
with respect to all or any part of the transaction or series of transactions. . . out of which the 
action arose." Nashv. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 464, 757P.2d 1180,1183 (1988)(quotingwith 
approval Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho at 258-59,668 P.2d 15 134-35). Comment d to § 24 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) states the effect of res judicata as 
follows: 
Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff 
sometimes attempts another action seeking the same or 
approximately the same relief but adducing a different substantive 
law premise or ground. This does not constitute the presentation of 
a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the same 
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transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the second 
action should be held barred. 
Id. The transactional concept of a "claim" is broad. Id. If it arises from the same transaction or 
series or transactions, a cause of action is barred even though the theory of liability differs from 
the prior cause of action. Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 778,186 P.3d 630, 634 (2008). A 
cause of action is barred even though supporting evidence differs from the prior cause of action. 
Id. 
The transaction or series of transactions underlying all of Taylor's lawsuits, including Riley 
Lawsuit #1 and #2, was the redemption of Taylor's stock. A part of that transaction or series of 
transactions is the Opinion Letter. The Stock Redemption Agreement and Opinion Letter were 
foundational to the professional negligence claim brought in Riley Lawsuit #1. (R., pp. 641, ~~ 
53; 644 ~~ 62 and 64.) The same Opinion Letter from the same transaction forms the centerpiece 
of the professional negligence claim brought in the present action (Riley Lawsuit #2). (R., pp. 25-
50.) Both claims arose out of the same Stock Redemption Agreement. Consequently, all claims 
arising out of the Stock Redemption Agreement were extinguished when Riley Lawsuit #1 was 
concluded. All claims were extinguished regardless of whether they are based on the same cause 
of action or legal theory and even if the supporting evidence differs. 
Nevertheless, the district court held that Taylor'S professional negligence claim against 
Riley is not barred by res judicata because Riley Lawsuit #1 and the present case "are not 
sufficiently related in time, space, origin, motivation or trial evidence to arise from the same 
transaction." (R., pp. 2562-2563.) Specifically, the district court based its ruling on the following: 
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(a) The district court held the gravaman of Taylor's complaint 
in Riley Lawsuit #1 was Riley aiding and abetting in 
committing torts against Taylor and acting to deprive Taylor 
of money and property. (R., p. 2561.) 
The gravaman of a complaint is not the test used to determine the application of res 
judicata. Instead, the district court was required to apply the broad transactional approach. The 
proper inquiry was whether Taylor's claims against Riley in Riley Lawsuit #2 arise out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as those alleged in Riley Lawsuit # 1, not whether the gravamen 
of the complaints differ. The professional negligence claims in both lawsuits arose out of the same 
Opinion Letter relating to the same Stock Redemption Agreement. 
(b) The district court held that Taylor "believed that his Stock 
Redemption Agreement was legal and fully enforceable" in 
2007-2008. (R., p. 2561.) 
Taylor's belief as to the validity of the Stock Redemption Agreement ten plus years after 
it was entered into is irrelevant to the application of res judicata. Most parties believe in their 
litigation positions. But, if information comes to light or events occur before or during the 
pendency of prior litigation, that challenges the party's position, that party is required to act to 
avoid the bar of res judicata regardless of how they feel about the strength of their position. A 
party is not allowed to await the outcome of the original challenge to a transaction and if wrong, 
sue again. Regardless, Taylor's belief that the Stock Redemption Agreement was legal and 
enforceable is belied by his threats to sue Riley (before Riley Lawsuit #1 was filed) should the 
Stock Redemption Agreement be determined to be illegal.3 
3 That the district court relied on Taylor's mental state in 2007-2008 about the enforceability of 
the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement actually supports the applicability of res judicata by 
highlighting the connections between and among that agreement, Riley Lawsuit #1 and Riley 
Lawsuit #2. 
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(c) The district court held that Riley Lawsuit # 1 arose out of 
Riley's defense of AlA in the AlA Lawsuit. (R., p. 2561.) 
Riley Lawsuit #1 did arise in part because of the "defense" of AlA in the AlA Lawsuit. 
But Riley was also sued because he allegedly took a position contrary to the Opinion Letter. (R., 
p. 641.) Riley is now being sued, in part, for the same thing. (R., p. 35.) Regardless, the Stock 
Redemption Agreement and Opinion Letter are operative facts that run through all of the many 
lawsuits brought by Taylor, including the AlA Lawsuit, Riley Lawsuit #1 and Riley Lawsuit #2. 
Said another way, if there had been no Stock Redemption Agreement or Opinion Letter, there 
would have been no professional negligence claim by Taylor against Riley in either Riley Lawsuit 
#1 or #2. 
(d) The district court held the "factual grouping" that 
constitutes a transaction in Riley Lawsuit #1 is the thwarted 
efforts of Taylor to gain control of AlA and collect the 
money due on the promissory note; Taylor was suing Riley 
for his behavior in representing AlA because he owed a duty 
not to represent AlA because he authored the Opinion Letter; 
while the Opinion Letter played a role in Riley Lawsuit # 1, 
its issuance arose from an entirely separate set of facts and 
circumstances. (R., p. 2562.) 
The district court's recognition that the Opinion Letter played a role in Riley Lawsuit #1 
mandates the application of res judicata under the broad transactional approach, because it is 
undisputed that the Opinion Letter plays a role in Riley Lawsuit #2. Both suits, by definition, arise 
out of the same transaction. The district court's "factual grouping" analysis to the contrary is based 
on a fine line distinction in contravention of the required broad interpretation of "claim" and of 
"the same transaction." In Riley Lawsuit #1, Taylor alleged that his efforts to collect on the 
promissory note in the AlA Lawsuit were thwarted in part due to Riley's alleged representation of 
AlA contrary to the opinions expressed in the Opinion Letter. Likewise, Taylor now asserts in 
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Riley Lawsuit #2 that he is entitled to the benefit of the illegal promissory note because he 
allegedly relied on Riley's opinions contrary to the illegality of the transaction. The district court's 
distinction is one without a difference. Res judicata requires that all claims based on his thwarted 
efforts to collect on the promissory note, regardless of origin, be brought in a single lawsuit (Riley 
Lawsuit #1). 
(e) The district court held there is a ten year gap between the 
transaction in Riley Lawsuit #1 and the transaction in Riley 
Lawsuit #2. (R., p. 2562.) 
A ten year gap between Riley authoring an allegedly negligent Opinion Letter and later 
allegedly taking a contrary position to the Opinion Letter is not determinative of the application of 
res judicata. Nor is it accurate. During that ten year period the transaction was restructured. (R., 
pp. 2306-2313.) AlA did not default on the promissory note until 2005. (R., p. 2398.) Taylor did 
not sue for breach of the promissory note until 2007. (R., p. 2388.) The illegality defense was not 
raised until April 2008. (R., pp. 1950-1960.) In response, Taylor first complained about the 
Opinion Letter in late July and early August of2008 (before Riley Lawsuit #1). (R., pp. 379-382; 
377.) Riley Lawsuit #1 was not filed until August 18,2008. (R., p. 620.) Riley Lawsuit #2 was 
not filed until October 1, 2009. (R., p. 25.) While chronologically a long period of time has 
elapsed, any such gap was and is based on the same transaction or, at a minimum, series of 
transactions. The supposed "gap" between "factual groupings" is merely the orderly passage of 
time until Taylor's claims against Riley allegedly accrued - which was at least four months before 
Riley Lawsuit #1 and eighteen months before Riley Lawsuit #2.4 
4 Interestingly, the district court held that Taylor did not suffer any damages as a result of the 
Opinion Letter until the illegality defense was first raised in April 2008 for statute of limitation 
purposes. (R., p. 1688.) Nevertheless, for res judicata purposes, the district court found 
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(f) The district court held the "factual groupings" are wholly 
unrelated and do not form a convenient trial unit. (R., p. 
2562.) 
A "transaction" need only arise out of all or any part of the same or series of transactions. 
Nash, 114 Idaho 464, 757 P.3d at 1183. It need not be the identical transaction. ld. It need not 
arise out of identical facts. ld. It need not be based on identical legal theories. ld. It need not 
seek the same relief. Id. The "factual groupings" of the two lawsuits are not "wholly unrelated," 
but in fact inextricably intertwined. Taylor alleged nearly identical facts in both Complaints 
against Riley based on the Opinion Letter. Taylor sought to amend his Complaint in Riley Lawsuit 
#1 to add additional allegations against Riley based on the Opinion Letter. Taylor alleged 
professional negligence against Riley relating to the Opinion Letter in both lawsuits. The "factual 
groupings" relating to both lawsuits sufficiently overlap to show that both lawsuits arise out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions (the Stock Redemption Agreement) or at least arise out 
of a part of the same or series of transactions (the Opinion Letter). 
(g) The district court held Riley Lawsuit #1 would focus on 
events in 2007-2008 regarding Riley's defense in the AlA 
Lawsuit while Riley Lawsuit #2 would focus on events 
surrounding the Stock Redemption Agreement and the 
Opinion Letter. (R., p. 2562.) 
The focus of a lawsuit is not determinative of whether res judicata applies. The concepts 
of "arise out of', "same claim" and "same transaction" are broad in the context of res judicata. 
Under the transactional approach there is no requirement that both lawsuits must focus on the same 
significance in the ten year gap existing between issuance of the Opinion Letter and the "factual 
groupings" underlying Riley Lawsuit #1 and Riley Lawsuit #2. (R., p. 2562.) These positions 
are difficult to reconcile other than to note that the effect of both rulings was to preserve Taylor's 
fourth attempt to sue on the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
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events or facts or time period. Claims are barred if they arise out of the same transaction or any 
part of the same transaction. 
Regardless, the district court is wrong. Riley Lawsuit # 1 had to focus on the Stock 
Redemption Agreement and the Opinion Letter in order to establish why Riley's alleged conduct 
in defending AlA in the AlA Lawsuit was "aiding and abetting wrongful torts." Riley Lawsuit #2 
has to focus on events regarding Riley's alleged participation in the defense of the AlA Lawsuit 
in 2007-2008 in order for Taylor to prove his professional negligence allegations arising out of 
Riley allegedly taking a contrary position. While the primary focus may differ, the same factual 
groupings underlie both cases. 
(h) The district court held the conduct of the attorneys in Riley 
Lawsuit #1 is not relevant to Riley Lawsuit #2. (R., p. 2562.) 
Riley's conduct in the prior lawsuit is relevant to the present lawsuit as best exemplified 
by Taylor's Complaint in this lawsuit. Taylor's Complaint need only satisfY notice pleading 
requirements. I.R.C.P., Rule 8(a)(1). The intricate detail in Taylor'S current Complaint by which 
he describes Riley's conduct in the AlA Lawsuit (which formed one of the bases for Riley Lawsuit 
#1) in order to meet the notice pleading requirements proves its relevance to Riley Lawsuit #2, at 
least for res judicata purposes. For instance, he pleads: 
Astonishingly, defendant Riley's firm, Hawley Troxell, actually represented AlA 
Services in the Litigation and argued that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares 
was illegal and the redemption agreements were unenforceable, even though 
Defendant Riley had issued and delivered the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor with 
various representations of fact and law, including, without limitation, that the 
redemption did not violate any laws, that all necessary consents had been obtained, 
and that the redemption agreements were enforceable. The [AlA] Litigation 
involved legal and factual issues based upon the same transaction documents 
negotiated and approved by Defendant Riley to redeem Reed Taylor'S shares and 
the Redemption Agreement, related agreements and later amended agreements. 
Notwithstanding the obvious conflicts of interest, Defendants Riley and Hawley 
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Troxell undertook interests adverse to those of Reed Taylor and AlA Services. 
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell had duties to not represent parties whose 
interests were adverse to their client AlA Services and Defendant Riley's former 
client and/or third party beneficiary Reed Taylor, particularly for the sole purpose 
of protecting the interests of the guilty insiders fraudulently and tortiously 
transferred millions of dollars of AlA Services' funds, assets and trade secrets - the 
amount of which would have been sufficient to pay most, if not all, of the over $6 
million owed to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his shares. 
(R., p. 35 at ~ 24.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Riley Lawsuit #2 complaint signals, under notice pleading, Taylor's intent to pursue 
his cause of action against Riley based, at least in part, on Riley's conduct in the AlA Lawsuit 
upon which Riley Lawsuit #1 is based. Contrary to the district court's ruling, Taylor himself 
establishes the relevance of Riley Lawsuit #1 to Riley Lawsuit #2. 
(i) The district court held the Opinion Letter was not central, or 
even important, in the outcome of Riley Lawsuit # 1. (R., p. 
2562.) 
The Opinion Letter was indeed important in the outcome, or at least hoped for outcome, of 
Riley Lawsuit #1. The outcome in Riley Lawsuit #1 was its dismissal for failure to state a claim 
under I.R.C.P., Rule 12 (b)(6). Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 831, 243 P.3d at 647. This was 
not, however, the outcome sought by Taylor. Taylor undertook herculean efforts to prevent 
dismissal of his complaint in that action by moving to amend his complaint on October 15,2008, 
nearly one year before Riley Lawsuit #2 was filed. (R., p. 669.) Central to this effort was Taylor'S 
attempt to amend his complaint to state a cognizable claim of professional negligence. Id. The 
pertinent allegations in the proposed Amended Complaint, as they relate to res judicata, are 
summarized as follows: 
~ 16 - Hawley Troxell (defined by Taylor to include Riley) is inappropriately and 
fraudulently asserting that Taylor has no rights because his redemption was illegal in an 
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attempt to avoid the causes of action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against 
them and to delay and/or thwart Taylor's rights and causes of action; 
~ 68 - Defendant Riley represented AlA in the redemption of Taylor's shares and the 
drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and other applicable 
agreements; was responsible for issuing Opinion Letters relating to the transaction which 
include various applicable representations and warranties, and is now asserting arguments 
counter to the representations made in the Opinion Letter drafted by Riley and assisted in 
the commission of torts by representing the corporations in various inappropriate 
transactions; 
~ 92 - Riley, as a former attorney for Taylor and the attorney who provided an Opinion 
Letter, owed Taylor special duties by and through an Opinion Letter "representing such 
facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations" which thereby 
invokes personal liability to Riley; that Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's representations; 
Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal and caused 
Taylor to incur damages; 
~ 99 - Defendant Riley owed Taylor special duties by and through an Opinion Letter that 
was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes personal liability to 
Riley; Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal; Taylor 
was damaged; 
~ 103 - Hawley Troxell' s (defined to include Riley) acts constitute professional negligence 
and such conduct damaged Taylor; 
~ 107 - Riley's services to Taylor through an Opinion Letter creates individual 
responsibility; 
~ 118 - Defendant Riley owes Taylor special duties by and through an Opinion Letter that 
was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes personal liability to 
Riley; Riley breached his duties when he asserted that transaction was illegal; which acts 
and/or omissions caused damage to Taylor. 
(R., pp. 676-677; 697; 704-710;713.) These allegations prove that the Opinion Letter was 
important to the outcome in Riley Lawsuit # 1. 
When examined closely, each of the district court's bases for not applying res judicata are 
far too narrow and ultimately incorrect. The prior and present professional negligence claims arise 
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from the same transaction, series of transactions or a part thereof. The district court erred in not 
applying res judicata to bar the present professional negligence claim. 
(4) The District Court's Prior Rulings Establish Res Judicata 
Applies to Claims Against Riley. 
What is perplexing about the district court's failure to apply res judicata to bar the 
professional negligence claim against Riley in this case is its change of position in examining the 
connections and similarities between Riley Lawsuit #1 and Riley Lawsuit #2. In ruling on the 
application of res judicata to Taylor's professional negligence claim against Hawley Troxell, the 
district court held it did apply and the claim was barred. (R., pp. 1682-83.) But, in ruling on the 
application of res judicata to Taylor's professional negligence claim against Riley, the district court 
held res judicata did not apply and the claim was not barred. (R., p. 2563.) 
In the present lawsuit, Taylor sued Hawley Troxell and alleged the same causes of action 
against it as he alleged against Riley, including a claim for professional negligence. (R., p. 26, ~ 
3; pp. 41-43.) In its May 10,2010 Decision and Order, the district court dismissed the professional 
negligence claim against Hawley Troxell on the grounds that it was barred by res judicata. (R., p. 
1683.) The district court's bases for dismissing that claim against Hawley Troxell as barred under 
res judicata, are as follows: 
"The history between some of the parties is extensive, going back to 1995." 
*** 
"1. Malpractice 
a. Hawley Troxell. The gist of Taylor's malpractice claim, albeit somewhat over 
simplified, is that Riley and Turnbow were negligent in performing legal work related to 
the Stock Redemption Transaction. His complaints relate specifically to the Opinion 
Letter, but also include references to other legal work performed. He alleges this 
negligence harmed both AlA and him. Hawley Troxell had no involvement in the 1995 
and 1996 transactions." 
*** 
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"b. Res Judicata. At oral argument Taylor disavowed making claims against Hawley 
Troxell that were made in the earlier Hawley Troxell litigation [Riley Lawsuit #1]. 
However, many paragraphs in the Complaint allege facts surrounding the AlA litigation 
and Taylor's claim that the conduct gives rise to liability. The operative facts giving rise 
to the claims made in the Nez Perce County suit against Hawley Troxell and Riley [Riley 
Lawsuit #1] concerned Hawley Troxell's representation of AlA in the AlA litigation. 
There is certainly an overlap in the parties and some of the same events figure in both 
suits." 
*** 
"In the earlier complaint against Hawley Troxell [Riley Lawsuit #1], Taylor alleged in part 
'defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction, which 
include various applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting 
arguments contrary to the representations made in the Opinion Letter drafted by 
Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley.'" [Citation omitted.] In his 
motion to amend the complaint in that action [Riley Lawsuit # 1], Taylor alleged Defendant 
Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an Opinion Letter. Riley breached 
his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal." 
*** 
" ... A comparison of the Complaint in this case [Riley Lawsuit #2] and the claims made, 
or that could have been made in the earlier litigation [Riley Lawsuit #1], show remarkable 
similarity as to the claimed breach of duty by Riley and Hawley Troxell. The present 
action, so far as it concerns Hawley Troxell, is no more than an effort to have this Court 
second guess Judge Brudie. The Court declines to do so." "To the extent Plaintiff seeks 
to make a claim against Hawley Troxell for malpractice based on the allegations in the 
complaint, the same is barred by res judicata." 
(R., pp. 1681-1683.) (Underlining added.)5 
The district court ruled that res judicata does not apply to Taylor's claims against Riley 
despite having previously and correctly found an extensive, relevant history between the parties 
going back to 1995; despite having previously acknowledged the overlapping operative facts 
giving rise to Riley Lawsuit #1, with respect to the parties and some of the same events as those 
in Riley Lawsuit #2; and despite doing a comparison of the complaints and finding remarkable 
similarity as to the professional negligence claims. There were no new facts or changes of 
5 The district court also dismissed other causes of action against Hawley Troxell based on res 
judicata. (R., p. 1690.) 
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circumstances between the district court's ruling that the professional negligence claim against 
Hawley Troxell was barred and when it ruled the same claim against Riley was not. There is 
nothing to explain how what the district court found remarkably similar evolved into the 
conclusion that the two lawsuits are not sufficiently related in time, space, origin, motivation or 
trial evidence to arise from the same transaction. 
c. Finality of Judgment. 
Finality of judgment refers to a final adjudication or judicial order or decree that ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. In re 
Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., 872 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1989). "To qualify for preclusion, a 
judgment must be valid, final, and on the merits." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §4432, at 298 (1981). On appeal, this Court remanded to the district court 
in Riley Lawsuit #1 for entry of a final judgment which was entered by the district court. Taylor 
v. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 849-50, 243 P.3d at 665-66. There was a finality of judgment in Riley 
Lawsuit #1. 
The district court erred in finding that Taylor's professional negligence claim against Riley 
was not barred by res judicata. The district court should be reversed and this matter remanded for 
dismissal of that claim. If this Court so rules there is no need to address the remaining issues, all 
of which are based on the professional negligence claim. 
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D. Taylor Has Waived His Claim of Professional Negligence Against Riley; the Opinion 
Letter Was Not the Proximate Cause of Taylor's Damages.6 
The district court held that the 1996 restructure of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, 
which expressly superseded the 1995 agreement and expressly waived claims arising out of AlA's 
default under the 1995 agreement, did not waive Taylor's claim for professional negligence against 
Riley. (R., pp. 2563-2565.) The district court also held that the 1996 agreement did not relieve 
Riley from being the proximate cause of Taylor's injuries. (R., p. 2565.) The district court's 
rulings are in error for the following reasons: (1) Taylor waived his right to sue on the 1995 
agreement and its attendant Opinion Letter when his chosen remedy on default was to restructure 
the Stock Redemption Agreement; (2) the 1996 restructure superseded the transaction for which 
the Opinion Letter was given and no new opinion letter was requested or provided; (3) the 1996 
restructure agreement expressly waived all remedies under the 1995 agreement; and (4) Taylor 
expressly waived all prior representations, warranties or guaranties. 
The Opinion Letter does not pertain to the agreement pursuant to which Taylor's stock was 
actually redeemed. Shortly after the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was entered into, AlA 
defaulted. Taylor had the choice of a number of remedies, which included accelerating the debt 
and suing for the amount due, and repossessing the pledged stock and selling the stock in a 
commercially reasonable manner. (R., pp. 2156-59.) He chose instead to waive the default and 
6 This argument is made as an alternative to the res judicata argument. If this Court determines 
that res judicata does not apply it presumably must find that the present professional negligence 
claim does not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Consistent with such a 
finding is a determination that the 1996 Restructure Agreement is the controlling agreement and, 
because there was no opinion letter requested or given for this agreement, all claims related to 
the 1995 Opinion Letter were either waived or superseded or it was not the proximate cause of 
Taylor's damages. 
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restructure the transaction. (R., pp. 2162-64.) After negotiations, in which Taylor was represented 
by independent counsel, the parties cancelled the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and replaced 
it with the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (hereinafter the "1996 
Restructure Agreement"). (R., pp. 2306-13.) No opinion letter was requested or given in 
connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement. (R., p. 2164.) 
The 1996 Restructure Agreement recites that the parties intended to restructure the 
transaction in several respects, including adjustment of the principal amount of the down payment 
note, extension of such note's maturity date, termination of a consulting agreement between Taylor 
and AlA, revision of a noncompetition agreement, termination of AlA's obligation to pay Taylor 
a monthly salary, amendment of the security agreement and stock pledge agreement, revision of 
certain representations, warranties and covenants, and modification of the default and remedies 
provisions. (R., pp. 2306-13.) The 1996 Restructure Agreement provided, "In exchange for this 
restructuring of the Company's obligations to Creditor [Taylor], Creditor is willing to agree to 
waive, and to forbear from exercising any remedies he may have for, any existing defaults under 
the Original Documents, including (without limitation) those defaults alleged in the Notice of 
Default." (R., pp. 2306-13.) (Underlining added.) 
Other than the payment schedule embodied in the $6M Note, the 1995 deal was completely 
expunged and a new deal was substituted therefor. (R., pp. 2306-13.) The 1996 Restructure 
Agreement provided that, "The Superseded Documents are of no further force or effect." (Id) 
The parties granted each other mutual releases. "Each of the Companies and Creditor hereby 
releases the other from any and all claims (whether known or unknown, anticipated or 
unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such party may have arising out of previous agreements 
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(including, without limitation, the Original Documents) or other business arrangement between 
Company and Creditor. ... " (Id) 
An attorney is an agent ofthe client. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 844,273 P.3d at 
660. Release ofthe principal releases the agent as well. C.J.S. Release § 63. Taylor waived any 
remedies he may have arising out of the original documents (which included the Opinion Letter) 
as against AlA. Taylor released AlA from all claims arising out of the 1995 Stock Redemption 
Agreement. Riley was an agent of AlA and therefore all remedies and claims against Riley were 
also waived or released. 
An opinion letter speaks only as of its date. Accord § 9; TriBar Report § 1.2(b) ("By 
custom, the opinion giver provides a professional judgment at a specific time, ordinarily to 
facilitate a closing, and has no continuing responsibility to the non-client opinion recipient.") An 
opinion recipient cannot rely on a previously given opinion with respect to a subsequent 
transaction. Id. at § 3.9. 
The operative documents are the 1996 Restructure Agreement and related documents, as a 
matter of law. In Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 988, 812 P.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1990), 
the holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage renegotiated the mortgage when the obligor 
defaulted. Id, 119 Idaho at 988, 812 P.2d at 296. The renegotiated agreement substituted a 
nonrecourse note and released the obligor from personal liability. This Court held that the holder 
of the note was bound by the modification of the agreement and could not sue the obligor for 
personal liability upon a subsequent default. Id, 119 Idaho at 990, 812 P.2d at 297. The same 
principles apply to the present case. 
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When Taylor agreed to the 1996 Restructure Agreement, the new agreement entirely 
replaced the prior stock redemption agreement. Taylor did not request or receive an opinion 
regarding the 1996 Restructure Agreement and may not base his professional negligence claim on 
an opinion that relates to documents other than those which controlled the sale of this stock.7 The 
1995 Opinion Letter ceased to apply because there was nothing to which it could apply. Because 
Taylor ultimately sold his stock pursuant to the 1996 Restructure Agreement, the 1995 Opinion 
Letter was no longer in force or effect and could not be the proximate cause of his damages. 
Taylor continues to recognize that the 1996 Restructure Agreement governs the sale of his 
stock and that no opinion was expressed regarding the legality of that agreement. Taylor filed suit 
in Washington, against the attorneys who represented him in connection with the redemption of 
his AlA stock and the later restructure. (R., p. 1895.) In the Complaint Taylor accused his own 
counsel, Scott Bell and Frank Taylor, of committing professional malpractice by acquiescing in 
the supersession of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement by the 1996 Restructure Agreement 
without obtaining a new opinion letter: 
18. In 1996, AlA Services defaulted on the redemption 
agreement and its payments on the $1.5 million note for the down 
payment. At this point, AlA Services through John and his 
investors, negotiated a restructuring of the redemption agreement 
with Reed. Reed continued to be represented by Bell, Taylor and 
Cairncross in the restructuring. Bell and Taylor did not request a 
7 Reed Taylor predicated his claim in the AlA Lawsuit on the 1996 Restructure Agreement. His 
Fifth Amended Complaint in the AlA Lawsuit (which was the last amendment allowed by the 
trial court and, therefore, the operative pleading) alleged that, "AlA Services, AlA Insurance and 
Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement." (R., p. 2388.) The prayer for relief sought by Reed Taylor pursuant 
the Fifth Amended Complaint was that he was entitled to such relief as he "[m]ay request before 
or at trial to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement. ... " (R., p. 2388.). 
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new opinion letter from AlA Services' legal counsel, nor did Bell 
and Taylor request shareholder approval for the transaction through 
a formal shareholder vote or by amending the articles of 
incorporation, both of which were authorized under I.e. § 30-1-6. 
For Bell and Taylor's services rendered in the 1995 and 1996 
transactions on behalf of Reed, Cairncross was paid in excess of 
$93,000 in attorney's fees and costs. 
(R., pp. 1900-01.) Taylor takes the position in Washington that the controlling document is the 
1996 Restructure Agreement and he was damaged because there was no new opinion letter, thereby 
acknowledging the 1995 Opinion Letter was no longer in effect. At a minimum, Taylor should be 
judicially estopped from attempting in this lawsuit to reach back to resurrect the defunct Opinion 
Letter relating to the superseded 1995 transaction. 
E. Taylor Changed the Circumstances Underlying the Opinion Letter Which was the 
Proximate Cause of His Alleged Damages. 
The district court held that the 2006 Subordination Agreement between Taylor and his ex-
wife Donna, subordinating AlA's obligation to redeem and pay for her preferred stock to payment 
of the $6 million promissory note payable to Taylor, thereby reversing the priority of payment 
upon which the Opinion Letter was based, was irrelevant to Taylor's claimed damages and did not 
relieve Riley of any liability in connection with the Opinion Letter. (R., p. 2566.) The district 
court erred by ignoring express language in the Opinion Letter that Riley assumed no responsibility 
for subsequent actions or events that affect the validity of any opinion. (R., p. 591.) 
"This opinion is rendered only with respect to the laws and the rules, regulations 
and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts of laws) of the State of Idaho that 
are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no responsibility for updating this 
opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or change of law 
occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the 
opinions expressed herein." 
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(R., p. 594.) The 2006 Subordination Agreement was both an event and an action that affected the 
validity of the previously expressed opinions. 
The district court erroneously ignored the effect ofthe 2006 Subordination Agreement that 
stripped AlA of a fail-safe provision in its Articles ofIncorporation that: (1) would have prevented 
the default that led to Taylor's alleged damages; and (2) created the circumstances that made the 
transaction illegal. 
When the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and 1996 Restructure Agreement were 
entered into, there was no violation ofIdaho Code § 30-1-6 because AlA's promise to pay Taylor 
for his common stock was contractually subordinated to AlA's obligation to pay Donna Taylor for 
the redemption of her Series A Preferred Stock. AlA issued preferred stock to Donna Taylor which 
was to cash her out of the corporation as part of the property division in connection with her prior 
divorce from Taylor. (R., pp. 2165-66.) The AlA Articles ofIncorporation then in place provided 
that the holder of stated value preferred stock (Donna Taylor) had the right to require AlA to 
redeem her stock "from legally available funds" at any time after September 14, 1993, but " ... 
only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions 
on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." (R., p. 1927.) 
Prior to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Donna Taylor exercised her right to have 
AlA redeem her Series A Preferred Shares. As of the date of the Opinion Letter, August 15, 1995, 
AlA's agreement to redeem Donna Taylor's preferred stock was set forth in a series of letter 
agreements to which Taylor was a party. (R., pp. 2372-94.) The letter agreements expressly 
subordinated AlA's obligation to redeem Taylor's common stock to its obligation to redeem 
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Donna Taylor's preferred stock. Id. Specifically, the January 11, 1995 and July 18, 1995 letter 
agreements signed by Taylor provided: 
Id. 
Further, AlA Services Corporation's note or any note payable to 
Reed J. Taylor for the $6,000,000 purchase price for his common 
shares will be subordinated to the redemption rights of your client 
[Donna Taylor] so that Reed J. Taylor will receive no principal 
payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has been 
completely redeemed. Reed J. Taylor will receive no interest 
payments on the note payable to him if payments to Donna Taylor 
are in default. 
Accordingly, when the Opinion Letter was drafted, AlA Articles ofIncorporation provided 
and Taylor contractually agreed, that Donna Taylor's preferred stock would be redeemed first and 
only "to the extent that such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act 
restrictions on the redemption of its own shares," and only then would the outstanding balance due 
to Taylor for the redemption of his stock become due. This subordination is reflected by the 
express terms of the $6 million Promissory Note, which provided that, "This Note is subordinate 
to the payment of the redemption obligations owed by the Company to Donna Taylor pursuant to 
that certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by Company, Payee [Taylor], Donna 
Taylor and Cumer Green." (R., pp. 2193-94.) No redemption of Donna Taylor's stock, hence no 
redemption of Taylor's stock, could occur if such redemption would "violate the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." Riley's 
contemporaneous handwritten notes show that the contractual subordination of Taylor's 
redemption obligation to Donna Taylor's and the fail-safe clause which precluded any stock from 
being redeemed unless such redemption would be legal under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, 
were taken into account in preparing the Opinion Letter. (R., p. 2383.) 
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The carefully orchestrated prioritization of payments, whereby Taylor was subordinated to 
Donna Taylor, was preserved when the transaction was restructured in 1996. In connection with 
the Restructure Agreement, the parties executed a Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement dated 
July 1, 1996, in which Taylor, Donna Taylor and AlA agreed that the redemption of Taylor's 
common stock remained subordinated to the redemption of Donna Taylor's preferred stock. (R., 
p.2363.) 
A subordinated debt does not become due until the senior debt is satisfied. In Culp v. Tri-
County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 736 P. 2d 1348 (Ct.App. 1987), a creditor brought an action 
to collect the amount allegedly due on subordinated notes. The Court, however, held that there 
could be no default on the subordinated debt while the senior loan was still outstanding. 
Payment in those circumstances would have violated the 
subordination agreements. Failure to perform a prohibited act 
cannot be treated as an event of default. 
Id at 897, 736 P.2d at 1351. The Idaho Supreme Court in Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 
97 P.3d 439 (2004), adopted with approval the definition of a subordination agreement from Culp: 
It is the subordination or the right to receive payment of certain 
indebtedness (the "subordinated debt" ) to the prior payment of 
certain other indebtedness (the "senior debt") of the same debtor. .. 
. [A] "complete" subordination permits no payment to be made on 
the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains 
outstanding. 
Id at 581,97 P.3d at 448. 
In late 2006, Taylor visited Donna Taylor at her home and succeeded in convincing her, 
without advice of independent counsel, to sign the 2006 Subordination Agreement reversing the 
priority of payment - i.e., Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate payment of the amount owed her 
by AlA for the redemption of her preferred stock to the amount owed to Taylor for the redemption 
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of his common stock. CR., pp. 2385-87.) The effect of the 2006 Subordination Agreement was to 
cause the amount owed Taylor to become due and payable and to deprive not only AlA, but Taylor 
himself, of the protection of the fail-safe clause. The subsequent invalidation of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement due to illegality was ironically the result of Taylor's own actions 
calculated to prefer himself to the detriment of his former spouse. Because Taylor himself changed 
an essential predicate upon which the Opinion Letter was based, Taylor proximately caused his 
own damages. He should have no cause of action against Riley, whose Opinion Letter was based 
upon different facts that existed in 1995. 
F. Riley Owes No Duty to Taylor, a Non-Client. 
The district court erred when it created a new exception to the general rule and held that 
Riley owed a duty in tort to Taylor with whom there was no attorney-client relationship. CR., p. 
1684.) The district court erred when it refused to reconsider this ruling. CR., p. 2569.) The district 
court compounded the error by holding that Riley is liable to Taylor, a non-client, for ordinary 
negligence. 8 CR., p. 2560, n 3.) To further complicate the issue, Taylor alleges duties owed to 
him, a non-client, beyond the non-negligent preparation of an opinion letter. 
This Court is urged to resist creating another exception to the rule that an attorney owes no 
duty of care to a non-client. If this Court is inclined to do so, however, it is urged to require more 
than simple negligence and to clarifY that the duty owed to a non-client opinion recipient is limited 
8 A client must establish, as an element oflegal malpractice, an attorney-client relationship 
which, if established, implicitly satisfies reasonable or justifiable reliance. Under the district 
court's new exception, a third party non-client need only prove duty, breach of duty, proximate 
cause and damages without regard to reliance, reasonable, justified or otherwise. 
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to the non-negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter upon which the opinion recipient reasonably 
and justifiably relies. 
1. Idaho Law Does Not Extend An Attorney's Duty to a Third Party Opinion 
Recipient. 
The invitation to expand an attorney's duty beyond his or her client has been accepted only 
once in Idaho. In Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), this Court carved 
out an exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone but the attorney's client, i.e., 
beneficiaries left out of a testamentary instrument drafted by an attorney. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho 
at 138,90 P .3d at 888. 
Recent opinions of this Court have reaffirmed this Court's reluctance to create any new 
exceptions. In St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Thomas R. Luciani, Stamper, 
Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.s., 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013), this Court determined that an 
assignee of a legal malpractice claim could bring the legal malpractice claim of the attorney's 
client if the claim is transferred in a commercial transaction along with other business assets and 
liabilities. 9 Id. at __ , 293 P. 3d at 667. Even in so holding, this Court reiterated the general and 
longstanding rule that an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and 
not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship. Id. 
This Court has expressly rejected other attempts to expand an attorney's duty to a third 
party, including two prior attempts by Taylor himself. See e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 
127 P.3d 156 (2005); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P13d 642 (2010). Indeed, this 
Court previously held that Taylor did not have an attorney-client relationship with Riley, lacked 
9 This case does not create a new exception but instead allows a third party assignee to bring a 
client's action based on the attorney's duties owed to the client. 
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the privity necessary to sue Riley for legal malpractice, reiterated the narrow exception in 
Harrigfeld that did not apply, rejected Taylor's citation to law from other jurisdictions and 
reiterated the well- established Idaho precedent that third parties have no standing to pursue 
professional negligence claims against an attorney. 
It is clear that Reed, in his complaints, has failed to allege that he is 
in an attorney-client relationship with Respondents, and therefore 
lacks the privity necessary to sue Respondents for legal malpractice. 
Harrigfeld is the only case in which this Court has found an 
exception to this requirement; specifically this Court found that the 
intended beneficiary of a testamentary instrument would have 
standing to bring a malpractice claim against the attorney who 
drafted said instrument. Id. at 138,90 P.3d at 888. This Court went 
on to conclude that, "[a] direct attorney-client relationship is 
required to exist between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in 
a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow circumstance.) 
Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. This principle was reaffirmed in a case 
to which Reed was a party - Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 
P.3d 156 (2005). Reed cites to law from other jurisdictions, ignoring 
the well-established Idaho precedent, in arguing that third-party 
beneficiaries to an attorney-client relationship may have standing to 
pursue malpractice claims against an attorney. Reed offers no 
compelling reason why this Court should expand its carefully 
reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld, and it is incredulous that Reed 
would attempt to assert that attorneys hired by the AlA Entities, to 
fight off Reed's litigation against those entities, were being retained 
for Reed's benefit. As Reed has failed to plead facts sufficient to 
find that he has standing to bring claims against Respondents for 
legal malpractice, we find that Reed has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, as to malpractice. 
McNichols [Riley Lawsuit #1],149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661. Despite this prior determination 
that Taylor is not owed a duty by Riley, the district court held to the contrary. (R., pp. 2567-69.) 
This Court has previously rejected Taylor's attempt to sue Riley as a third-party beneficiary and 
this Court is urged to do so again.lO 
\0 It is anticipated that Taylor will argue (again) that case law from other jurisdictions stands for 
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2. If a Duty Exists it Must Be Limited to Drafting the Opinion Letter. 
Taylor alleges that Riley had a duty not only to issue a non-negligent opinion letter but also 
owed him a duty: (1) to ensure proper shareholder resolutions are adopted; (2) to ensure 
compliance with all applicable statutes (here, specifically Idaho Code § 30-1-6); (3) to ensure that 
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents were enforceable; and (4) not to take 
conflicting positions in litigation from the Opinion Letter. (R., pp. 41-43.) Not even the case law 
from other jurisdictions relied on by the district court and Taylor below extend an attorney's duty 
to a third-party opinion letter recipient beyond drafting a non-negligent opinion letter. The other 
"duties" alleged by Taylor are duties owed, if at all, solely to an attorney's client. These are the 
very types of duties to which attach the strong policy considerations previously recognized by this 
Court in limiting an attorney's liability to third-parties: (1) protecting attorneys from the threat of 
retaliatory litigation, (2) ensuring that attorneys may zealously advocate for their client without 
fear of reprisal; and (3) protecting judicial economy against multifarious lawsuits. McNichols, 149 
Idaho at 842, 243 P.3d at 658. 
Should this Court adopt the district court's new exception to the general rule and allow 
third-party opinion letter recipients standing to sue another party's attorney, the scope ofthat new 
exception must be clearly stated: The opinion letter drafter's sole and only duty to the third-party 
opinion letter recipient is to draft and issue a non-negligent opinion letter. 
the proposition that an opinion recipient is entitled to sue someone else's attorney despite the 
lack of an attorney-client relationship. As this Court acknowledged in McNichols, the law from 
other jurisdictions is contrary to the well-established and long standing Idaho law that third-
parties (with one narrow exception) do not have standing to pursue malpractice claims against an 
attorney. 
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3. If a Duty Exists, the Cause of Action Must Be Based on More Than Ordinary 
Negligence. 
In addition to creating a new exception to the general rule against lawsuits brought by non-
clients against someone else's attorney, the district court determined that the cause of action 
created was not a malpractice action but rather "an ordinary negligence action." (R., p. 2560, n. 
3.) The district court acknowledged that a malpractice claim requires "the claimant prove the 
existence of attorney-client relationships" but ruled "the attorneys have a duty to [Taylor] 
notwithstanding the lack of attorney-client relationships." Id 
It is the very existence of the privity requirement of an attorney-client relationship that 
provides certain safeguards and limitations to an attorney's exposure to malpractice claims. This 
privity requirement brings with it the ability of the attorney to enter into a written contract 
expressing specific terms of engagement which define (and limit) the scope of representation. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620, 272 P.3d 1247,1251 (2012). (The scope of an attorney's 
contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained.) In 
addition, an attorney's "duty to a client is established by professional obligations developed by the 
Idaho State Bar and this Court." Id at 622, 272 P.3d at 1253 (J. Jones special concurrence). "The 
contours of an Idaho lawyer's duty of care are generally spelled out in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct (LR.C.P.)." Id These privity safeguards and limitations are not available 
when dealing with non-clients. 
In those jurisdictions that have extended a duty to third party opinion recipients, the privity 
requirement has been replaced with justifiable reliance. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, 
Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Woods, 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.2d 318 (1992). The opinion 
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recipient bears the burden of proving that his or her loss was caused by reliance on the opinion 
letter and that the reliance was justifiable. Id 
A legal opinion deals only with the specific legal issues it explicitly addresses. ABA Legal 
Opinion Accord (1991) ("Accord") § 18. In keeping with the Accord's provisions on implied 
opinions, Accord § 7 provides that an Opinion Recipient may not rely on an Opinion or Opinion 
Giver for any legal or other analysis beyond that set forth in the Opinion Letter. Similarly, Section 
1.6 of the TriBar Report provides: 
1.6 OPINION RECIPIENT RELIANCE ON OPINION LETTERS 
Customary practice affects not only the conduct of the opinion giver but also that 
of the opinion recipient. ... The third-party opinion recipient is entitled to rely 
only on what is stated in the opinion letter. ... [T]he opinion recipient has no right 
to rely on an opinion if reliance is unreasonable under the circumstances or the 
opinion is known by the opinion recipient to be false. 
TriBar Opinion Committee Report on Third-Party "Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. Law. 591 (1998) 
§ 1.6; See also Field & Smith § 3:9. Without actual reliance, any opinion recipient claim based on 
the opinion should fail. Id 
Here, the district court found a duty existed notwithstanding the lack of an attorney-client 
relationship, but failed to replace the privity requirement with justifiable reliance. If a new 
exception is adopted, the elements of the "professional negligence" cause of action thereby created 
should include, in addition to the elements of ordinary negligence (duty, breach, proximate cause 
and damages), the requirement that the opinion recipient prove justifiable and reasonable reliance 
on the opinion. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Riley respectfully requests that this Court overturn the district court's failure to dismiss the 
professional negligence claim against Riley on the grounds that: (1) any recovery is based on an 
illegal contract; (2) his claim is barred by res judicata; (3) his claim was waived or released; (4) 
his damages were not proximately caused by Riley; or (5) Riley does not owe him a duty. 
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